So near, so far, so what is social distancing? A fundamental ontological account of a mobile place brand by Rossolatos, George
Vol.:(0123456789)
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-020-00186-z
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
So near, so far, so what is social distancing? A fundamental ontological 
account of a mobile place brand
George Rossolatos1 
Revised: 5 June 2020 / Accepted: 23 September 2020 
© Springer Nature Limited 2020
Abstract
This paper offers a social phenomenological reading of the globally binding practice of ‘social distancing’ in light of the 
precautionary measures against the spreading of the Covid-19 virus. Amid speculation about the far-reaching effects of 
temporarily applicable measures and foresights about the advent of an ethos that has been heralded by the media as the ‘new 
normal’, the ubiquitous phenomenon of social distancing calls for a fundamental ontological elucidation. The purported 
hermeneutic that is situated in the broader place branding and experiential marketing literatures places Covid-19 in the shoes 
of Being, and, therefore, imagines how Being would behave ontologically if it were a virus. By arguing that the virus does 
operate like Being, five theses are put forward as experiential interpretive categories with regard to the ontological status 
of Covid-19. The adopted approach makes the following contributions to the extant literature: First, it addresses a wholly 
new phenomenon in place branding, namely a pre-branded place whose meaning is non-negotiable, globally applicable and 
seemingly equivalent to pure void. Second, it advances the application of phenomenological research in place branding and 
experiential consumption by highlighting the aptness of the so far peripheral (in the marketing discipline) strand of Hei-
deggerian fundamental ontology. Third, it extends the meaning of place in the place branding literature, by showing how 
spatialization is the outcome of temporalization, in line with the adopted phenomenological perspective.
Keywords Social distancing · Place branding · Experiential consumption · Covid-19 · Social phenomenology · 
Fundamental ontology · Rhetoric
Introduction: why fundamental ontology 
and why now?
Heideggerian existential phenomenology surfaced at the 
turn of the 20th C. with the magnum opus Being & Time 
(2001), as a fundamental ontology with an indispensable 
social orientation (aka a social ontology), intent on subvert-
ing both philosophical metaphysics, as well as the cogito-
centric approach of Husserlian phenomenology (that was 
bequeathed in different ways to offshoots/diversions that 
engage with a cogito-centric platform, including Mer-
leau–Ponty’s corporeal turn (Malpas 2018), Sartre’s existen-
tialism, Schutz and Luckmann’s (1974) social phenomenol-
ogy). Its interpretive merits, even if someone does not buy 
the entire intellectual baggage that is offered in Heidegger’s 
prolific output, consist in pursuing in each instance of the 
existential analytic a dual orientation. This orientation con-
sists in addressing sociocultural phenomena both in terms 
of their ontically situated existence, as well as in terms of 
their fundamental ontological ground, called Being (a quasi-
equivalent to god in abstractness, although not the same as 
regards the concept’s philosophical, rather than theological 
roots- any criticisms pertaining to the reduction of ontology 
to ontotheology aside for the time being).
Fundamental ontology is particularly pertinent in the 
face of increasingly uniform globalizing discourses that 
seek to bring about a univocal, all-binding ethos (what 
is trumpeted as the ‘new normal’) in the time of Covid-
19. This is a temporal moment in the history of mankind 
that suspends all activities as we know them in the face 
of a menacing force that is manifested as a lethal virus. 
The magnitude of the sweeping effects of this virus legiti-
mates us in claiming that in the time of Covid-19 Being 
has been replaced with a virus. In this temporal suspension 
from becoming as we knew it, new cultural practices have 
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been introduced, while current ones are constantly being 
reframed.
The newly introduced practice of social distancing 
which amounts to the institution of a ‘dead zone’ (as will 
be called later on), as spatial distance between subjects in 
public space, not only afforded to redefine how we interact 
in public, but also what is entailed in transgressing the 
boundaries of this mobile space.
Social distancing is particularly pertinent for place 
branding, as it opens up a wholly new way of experienc-
ing intersubjectively public space. This novel experien-
tial mode is further substantiated by the following: (i) the 
ubiquity of this spatialization strategy (ii) the mobility of 
this space in-between subjects (iii) the utter absence of 
any symbolism that renders it akin to an experiential void, 
i.e. it is diametrically opposed to, for example, memo-
rial spaces that are responsible for construing memories 
based on overt symbolism; there is ‘nothing to be seen’ in 
this space (iv) its univocal branding as a no-go zone that 
potentially harbors the virus whose meaning is not nego-
tiable by individual brand associations (v) the institution 
of a new topology with bespoke geographical boundaries 
that transcend received demarcations, i.e. the virus has an 
autonomous modus operandi and its own spatialization 
rationale.
The cultural practice of social distancing or maintaining 
one’s distance from another in physical space, constitutes 
an inviolable mandate whose meaning overshadows that of 
a mere social norm. Social distancing is a matter of life or 
death. Therefore, social distancing is by default not just a 
functional issue in ordinary social interaction, or an ontic 
issue (in Heidegger’s terms), but a social ontological issue 
that defines in a fundamental manner being-with in public 
space. Theorizing the implications of this mandatory spac-
ing on an ontological level is, therefore, of primordial impor-
tance in understanding how essential aspects of socialization 
are being redefined by Covid-19 as the now/new Being.
In light of the above introductory remarks, this paper pur-
sues the following argumentative pathway: An overview of 
key concepts of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is offered 
as the conceptual scaffolding for the ensuing existential phe-
nomenological analytic. This is followed by a discussion that 
is intent on situating fundamental ontology among the preva-
lent perspectives in contemporary place branding theory and 
in justifying its relative merits in understanding Covid-19′s 
spatialization strategy and the meaning of social distanc-
ing as lived experience. Then, five theses are presented as 
regards the macro-cultural implications and the social func-
tions of the in-between space that marks the boundaries of 
social interaction in the time of the pandemic. Finally, the 
analysis wraps up by pointing out the implications and fur-
ther applications of this study in a broader technoscientific 
regime.
Key concepts in Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology
Claiming to be offering even an introductory overview of 
Heidegger’s voluminous conceptual armory in a single arti-
cle section is bound to loom like a lethal deathrow with a 
river monster. This section performs a more humble task by 
setting out to familiarize marketing researchers who are not 
necessarily versed in Heideggerian ontology with a limited 
set of concepts, such as the ontological difference between 
Being and beings, being as existence (Dasein), space and 
time, being-towards-death, authenticity/inauthenticity, 
ready-to-hand/present-at-hand. These terms are narrowly 
relevant to appreciating how this perspective attains to shed 
light to the meaning of the lived experience of void space 
in the practice of social distancing. Three seminal works by 
Heidegger are mainly drawn upon that are directly relevant 
to space and time, namely Being & Time (2001), Time & 
Being (1972), and The basic problems of phenomenology 
(1988). Also, it should be stressed at the very beginning 
of this conceptual exposition that Heideggerian ontology 
is not endorsed here in an uncritical manner. This will be 
demonstrated both here and in the final section that ques-
tions fundamental tenets from critical theoretic and decon-
structive angles, aimed at understanding key aspects of the 
philosophical perspective’s rhetorical structuration.
With these provisos in mind, it must be established at 
the very outset that Heidegger’s ontology is highly anthro-
pocentric. At its kernel lies the human being that is defined 
as existence or Dasein (in German), literally meaning 
being-there (‘sein’ and ‘da’). This ‘thereness’ constitutes 
the place of truth for human subjects, a truth that always 
withstands appropriation by a subject as full presencing. 
Spatiality, thus, is of central importance in understanding 
the essence of human beings. This essence (roughly speak-
ing) rests with Being or what appears each time that we 
ask ‘what is X.Y.Z?’ Being is presupposed in every sen-
tence uttered by beings. Therefore, any investigation (e.g. 
cultural, philosophical) about what it means to be human is 
conditioned by Being that presents itself in the copula ‘is’.
The space of ‘thereness’ is metaphorical, or, in Derrida’s 
terms, archi-metaphorical as it buttresses the entire phenom-
enological edifice of fundamental ontology. The difference 
between Being and beings was termed by Heidegger the 
ontological difference. This does not amount to the differ-
ence between a transcendental god and finite humans, but, in 
a highly anthropocentric manner, to the horizon of possibili-
ties that ‘is’ Dasein. In other words, Being is human exist-
ence as potentiality-for-Being. It denotes an open horizon for 
fulfilling one’s potential (and not a super-human entity that 
is capable of monitoring ordinary affairs, while refraining 
from intervening in them).
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Ontological difference also displays a spatialization 
rationale, insofar as it points to a distance between Being and 
beings. This distance is experienced as a constant nearing 
and distancing, insofar as Being is at the same time nearby 
beings as totality and horizon, and far from beings, as real-
ized potentiality-for-Being. This impossible approximation 
institutes a paradox at the heart of existence, namely that for 
as long as a subject is, it may not reach Being, however with-
out being enmeshed in the process of approximation it may 
not be as such. Dasein is always already caught up in this 
paradoxical space. Space, here, is not intended as a metric 
system for a tactile container and as mere res extensa, but as 
existential space, always in a process of spatialization. This 
is a very important aspect of fundamental ontology, of direct 
pertinence to place branding, as will be further illustrated in 
the ensuing section. The relationship of beings to their Being 
is experienced as spatialization in terms of constant near-
ing and distancing. In other words, what is near is always 
already far from being approximated as such.
The underlying distinction in the preceding sentence con-
cerns another fundamental aspect of Heideggerian ontol-
ogy, namely that between authentic and inauthentic exist-
ence. Existing authentically involves heeding Being in an 
unadulterated manner, that is as pure form, whereas exist-
ing inauthentically involves being oblivious to the question 
of Being, while being enmeshed in ordinary affairs, or, as 
put by Heidegger (2001), lost in the Mit-sein (among the 
anonymous ‘they’ in ordinary idle speech). Although Hei-
degger claims that this distinction is not intended to devalue 
practices such as reading fashion magazines, for example, it 
does manifest an underlying tendency at valorizing specula-
tive philosophical discourse over empirical discourses. This 
speculative distinction is axiomatically posited as such, and 
has been vehemently criticized by critical theorists, such 
as Adorno (1973), as the jargon of authenticity (also notice 
that Krell (2015) opts for using the terms ‘appropriate’ and 
‘inappropriate’ instead of ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ 
which is a more accurate translation in terms of convey-
ing that the ontological question lies closer to the ‘proprius’ 
of Dasein compared to ontically grounded ones; also see 
Inwood 1999).
From a critical standpoint, it may be counterargued 
that Heidegger’s latent valorization of vacuous formal-
ism amounts to living in a constant state of negation, or in 
adopting a negatively nihilistic posture (in Nietzche’s will-
to-power terms). Heidegger, of course, claims the opposite, 
namely that being enmeshed in ordinary affairs amounts to 
a forgetfulness of Being, to residing in a state of oblivion, 
even going to such extremes as to almost vindicate humanity 
for being ‘thrown’ into everydayness (apparently from some 
sort of utopian paradisic [parasitic] being fully present to 
oneself). From a relativist point of view, either side in this 
dialogue is legitimate, and ultimately boils down to whether 
one prefers to live as a monk or as a politician, without pre-
cluding that monks may also be politicians, as attested by 
figures such as Dalai Lama, the Pope, the Kung Fu master 
(starring David Carradine).
In any case, living inauthentically is an inevitable condi-
tion of human existence, according to Heidegger, and it is 
through fissures in a cultural inauthentic fabric that beings 
are summoned to respond to the overarching question of 
Being. Such fissures include instances where practical equip-
ment breaks down. In these instances, what is practically 
proximate as ready-to-hand exposes its instrumental ration-
ale (Rae 2010) as equipmentality, and at the same time its 
facticity as part of a praxiological nexus. It is only when a 
tool becomes divested of its functionality that it emerges as 
present-at-hand. In our case, a car’s readiness-to-hand as 
transportation means broke down in the face of a globally 
enforced lockdown, during which civilians’ out-of-home 
movements were prohibited. In this predicament, cars were 
divested of their habitual meaning as parts of a cultural 
nexus, and distinctive sign-systems, while being transformed 
to present-at-hand objects. And what this presencing shows 
is the unconditional (in instrumental terms) co-belonging-
ness of beings with other beings and with objects in an onto-
logical milieu. “Both subject and object are thereby ‘placed’ 
within the same structure, rather than one or the other being 
the underlying ground for that structure” (Malpas 2018, p. 
35).
This distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity 
is carried over to temporality which, in fact, is more pri-
mordially related to being’s Being compared to spatiality. 
This may be demonstrated with reference to the process of 
spatialization, as above described. In order for space to be 
spatialized, i.e. to be embedded in a universally meaningful 
formation, it requires time. Time as horizon of temporal-
ity conditions Dasein’s existence fundamentally, as well as 
being-in-space. “Heidegger’s prioritization of temporality in 
Being and Time takes the form of an assertion of temporal-
ity as the originary foundation for the unity of Dasein in its 
entirety” (Burdett 2015, p. 115). “The ontological condition 
of the possibility of the understanding of being is temporal-
ity itself” (Heidegger 1988, p. 228).
To make this argument more palatable, think of move-
ment in pure void, without any tactile ground, as in outer 
space. Still, movement in outer space requires time, 
despite the fact that no ground, strictly speaking, has been 
covered. The real reason, though, behind Heidegger’s pri-
oritization of time over space is that since the existence 
of Dasein is tantamount to potentiality-for-Being, beings 
are always ahead of themselves as yet-to-come or as unre-
alized potential. This yet-to-come presupposes a future 
tense, as well as the possibility of this future to be envi-
sioned from a present and a past, as “existential projection 
or fore-casting of Dasein as possibility-being” (Krell 1986, 
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p. 32). This is why not only temporality is the foundation 
of space and the condition for spatialization, but authentic 
temporality is equivalent to the co-presence of past, pre-
sent and future. Each temporal mode constitutes, then, a 
temporal ec-stasis, as termed by Heidegger, literally mean-
ing (in Greek) standing (‘-stasis) outside (‘-ec’) of oneself. 
And since Da-sein is always being-there, temporality as 
the horizon of becoming of beings as beings-there is the 
primordial phenomenological way of existence. This will 
be further illustrated with reference to the time of Covid-
19 in the section after the next one. Although Heidegger 
prioritizes the future among the three temporal ecstases in 
his early work Being & Time (2001), in his later work Time 
& Being (1972) presence is posited as the most eminent 
mode.
The final conceptual component that is essential in this 
hermeneutic endeavor concerns Dasein’s existence as funda-
mentally being-towards-death. This is intimately interwoven 
with Dasein’s future orientation. Death, here, is used as a 
synonym for ‘end’ or ‘teleology’, as conceived by Aristotle, 
that is ‘telos’ as end-point, and at the same time as objec-
tive conditioning teleologically the process of becoming (see 
Rossolatos 2018a,b). The paradox that lies in the heart of 
spatialization as contemporaneously nearing/distancing, and 
of existence as triply ecstatic, also applies in this instance. 
The answer to the question of Being will have been fur-
nished at the point where being will no longer be capable of 
articulating it (i.e. the moment of physical death), whereas 
for as long as beings are their death as teleological horizon 
is in question.
In conclusion to this section, a short commentary on the 
rhetorical construal of fundamental ontology is offered, for 
the sake of both pre-empting perceiving Heidegger’s per-
spective as a canonical social ontological blueprint, and 
facilitating the transition that will be made later from Hei-
degger’s essentializing discourse towards a rhetorical topol-
ogy that views space, time, and social distancing as meta-
phorical constructs or literalized metaphors (Mitchell 2012, 
2017). As pointed out by Gross (2005), Heidegger relocates 
rhetoric at the heart of his fundamental ontology.
In this respect, the ontological difference between Being 
and beings amounts to a sublimation of the verb ‘to be’ that 
is displaced from its ordinary grammatical contours and pos-
ited as ideational existential depth. Heidegger’s recurrent 
rhetorical ploy follows three moments: initially, the about-
ness of an assertoric statement that employs the verb ‘to be’ 
is problematized by making the assumption that in order to 
understand what is referred to, we must first obtain an under-
standing of the verb ‘to be’. Then, the question of what is 
that which precedes any ontical determination (as grammati-
cal phenomenon) is catapulted to an overarching existential 
question. The grammatical origin of the speculation recedes 
in the background and from that point onwards the human 
condition is identified with a phenomenology of Being as 
autonomous ‘entity’ (yet intimately related with beings).
This autonomization of Being is evinced most eminently 
in the employment of the middle voice in the description 
of the dialectic of truth. The dialectic of truth is not a pro-
cess that is carried out by humans based on the exercise of 
free will. Humans do not disclose truth which would force 
the aletheic process to lean on the agentic side as truth-
finding. Rather, the process of disclosure is presented with 
the employment of middle voice as a ‘bringing forth from 
concealment’, that is as a self-subsistent process that is nei-
ther fully motivated by beings, nor imposed onto beings 
by some sort of transcendental entity, as Being (also see 
Heidegger 1972, p. 8; Desilet 1991 on the translation of 
‘es gibt’ as ‘it gives’). In fact, as Derrida contends, it is 
questionable whether Being is anything else than an “ontic 
metaphor struggling in vain to become ontological concep-
tuality” (Krell 2015, p. 90). As also pointed out by Karrer 
(2006, pp. 5–7), “Heidegger’s basic metaphors are territo-
rial (ground, horizon, region, district) […] Border rheto-
ric uses limit, border, and boundary interchangeably, and 
mixes it with words of closure/openness, experience and 
other existential or interstitial words to achieve a mystify-
ing theoretical-sounding effect which these words carry over 
from their semantic history.”
Upon sketching out the key concepts from Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology that will be recruited in the offered 
account of social distancing, the following section dem-
onstrates how this perspective complements and extends 
the ontology of place branding in light of the scrutinized 
phenomenon.
Situating fundamental ontology 
in the contemporary place branding 
landscape
Although the place branding literature is conceptually rich 
from a modeling point of view, considerably less reflection 
has been allotted to ontological considerations of space and 
place. In this section, the Heideggerian ontological perspec-
tive on spatialization is situated amid the dominant perspec-
tives in place branding, and its relative merits are discussed.
Each of the aforementioned strands shares different 
ontological assumptions about place brands. In particular, 
the identity perspective views places as assemblages of 
promotional discourses and identity claims. The associa-
tionist approach reduces the meaning of place to the nexus 
of brand associations in the minds of various stakeholders. 
The narrative approach identifies places with the stories 
and texts (Hanna and Rowley 2008; Rossolatos 2020a, 
b) that circulate about them. The interactionist approach 
identifies places with the collective constructions of the 
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meaning of places that shape up through social interac-
tions. Lucarelli and Giovanardi (2016) added a fifth per-
spective, the mobilities one (although it may be viewed 
tentatively and tenuously as an extension of the interac-
tionist approach). The mobilities perspective emphasizes 
the construal of space through bodily movement. “The new 
mobilities paradigm represents an approach that is under-
pinned by a relational ontology as it promotes an under-
standing of society and the lived experiences of people 
(and consumers) not as fixed and given but as constantly 
played out from the relationships between their move-
ments and trajectories” (Lucarelli and Giovanardi 2016, 
p. 324). Finally, Kavaratzis and Ashworth (2015) suggest 
a culturally inflected meaning of place as a set of ele-
ments which may be picked by consumers to mold a place 
culture as they choose. The enculturation process has also 
been posited by Florek and Kavaratzis (2014) as central 
to the transformation of meaningless, physical space into 
meaningful place. In this respect, places have been identi-
fied with social constructs and assemblages (Warnaby and 
Medway 2013). Most importantly, Warnaby and Medway 
(2013, pp. 348–349) suggest three ways whereby place has 
been contextualized: location, locale and sense of place. 
The latter incorporates the temporal dimension, that is the 
primary dimension wherein cultural practices are enacted 
according to Heidegger, albeit in an inauthentic manner, 
and, hence, ontical, not ontological.
The above identified perspectives, with the exception of 
the mobilities and the text oriented ones, assume latently 
a subject/object divide, even when not explicitly admitting 
it. The mobilities perspective reverses the priority between 
body and mind by assigning agentic status to corporeality, 
thus lying closer to a Merleau–Pontyan perspective. Hei-
degger would be quite aversive to such a reversal, especially 
given that it amounts to retaining the Cartesian distinction 
between res cogitans and res extensa on the inverse which he 
overcame with the paradigmatic shift from subject to Dasein.
Lucarelli and Borbstrom (2013) attempted a synthesis 
of the place branding literature by drawing on the onto-
logical/epistemological criteria that were used by Burrell 
and Morgan in their model of sociological paradigms. 
According to this model,
studies adopting an objectivist approach, whether 
they are radical structuralist or functionalist, share 
an ontological (realist) and epistemological (positiv-
ist and post-positivist) standpoint, usually adopting a 
nomothetic methodology and a determinist point of 
view about human nature. Studies adopting a sub-
jectivist approach, whether they are radical human-
ist or interpretivist, are ontologically nominalist and 
epistemologically relativist (social constructionist) 
(Lucarelli and Borbstrom 2013, p. 71).
Subsequently, Lucarelli and Borbstrom (2013) perform 
their synthesis based on the axis of objectivism/subjec-
tivism which culminates into six types of place brand-
ing research, namely the critical structuralist, the radical 
humanist, the production, the co-production, the con-
sumer-oriented and the appropriation perspectives. This 
is an interesting endeavor and beyond any doubt a schol-
arly undertaking that paves the way for critically engag-
ing with epistemological and ontological issues that more 
often than not remain unaddressed in place marketing and 
branding conceptual and empirical research. However, it 
is not clear why the authors, on the one hand, selected 
Burrell and Morgan’s framework which tends to aggre-
gate quite heterogeneous perspectives under individual 
types, and, on the other hand, how they categorized the 
selected place branding perspectives under the objectivist/
subjectivist pair (especially given that the categorization 
is presented in the final section of the paper without any 
allusion to specific features from the concerned papers). 
This categorization would require a more explicit display 
of the underlying conceptual components, given that in the 
majority of instances the mentioned authors do not assume 
explicitly epistemological and ontological positions. But, 
most importantly, this classification perpetuates the Car-
tesian distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, 
while resting on the assumption that objectivist accounts 
of place branding amount to a correspondence between 
how place is lived and how it is in itself, i.e. in its materi-
ality as res extensa.
The only classification, to my knowledge, of place con-
struals that lies closer to the Heideggerian project than the 
rest has been put forward by Cresswell (cited in Warnaby 
and Medway 2013, p. 349). This typology features three 
approaches to the meaning of place, namely descriptive, 
social constructionist, and phenomenological.
The descriptive (or ideographic) approach postulates that 
the world is a set of places that can be studied as unique and 
particular entities. The social constructionist approach views 
place as the progeny of underlying social processes. The 
phenomenological approach seeks to define the essence of 
human existence as being necessarily in “place”. The mean-
ing of being in, phenomenologically speaking, was analyzed 
in the previous section from a temporal point of view.
On a very different note, the main contributions of Hei-
deggerian fundamental ontology amid the multivocal con-
ceptualizations of space and place branding consist in the 
following: (i) space is dislodged from the subjectivism/
objectivism binarism which is premised on an object ontol-
ogy (i) for the first time space is viewed dynamically as 
existential spatialization (ii) this process is intimately inter-
woven with temporalization, as the condition of spatializa-
tion (iii) space is explicitly relativized in terms of proximity 
by assigning primacy to a ‘thereness’ as the place where 
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Dasein is bound to be, yet which for as long as it is cannot 
be presenced in fullness.
In an attempt to anchor more succinctly Heidegger’s take 
on spatialization in the broader marketing literature, with the 
aim of overcoming ossified binarisms such as the objectiv-
ism/subjectivism divide in place branding, the expository 
focus will now turn to the experiential marketing literature.
Points of convergence between experiential 
marketing research and Heideggerian 
phenomenology
Phenomenology in general and phenomenological strands in 
particular have received scant and piecemeal attention in the 
broader consumer research and branding literatures. Never-
theless, their value in reorienting attention from individual 
psychological processing mechanisms to more immersive 
aspects of consumption has been noted time and again (e.g. 
in the case of entertainment marketing by Hackley and 
Tiwsakul 2006). It is in such a contrastive mode with the 
entrenched marketing research vernacular that focus on the 
experiential aspects of consumption was laid ever since Hol-
brook and Hirschman’s (1982) seminal publication on con-
sumer fantasies, feelings and fun (also see Holbrook 2018).
Interest in phenomenology has been growing ever since 
(Thompson et al. 1989), albeit to a greater extent as qualita-
tive research method (i.e. the phenomenological interview, 
cf. Becker 2018), in line with its increasing importance in 
the methodological roster of qualitative inquiry across dis-
ciplines and the popularization of techniques such as imagi-
native variation and the phenomenological (transcendental) 
reduction, rather than as distinctive strands, equipped with a 
rich conceptual armory for performing cultural hermeneutic 
readings (Hirschman 1986; Thompson et al. 1994; Elliott 
1997), especially of extraordinary consumptive and brand-
ing phenomena. And even in this limited context, Husserlian 
phenomenology has tended to be the norm, primarily due to 
its being neatly aligned with contemporary cognitivistic and 
psychologist perspectives- despite the fact that overcoming 
psychologism and rooting the social sciences in philoso-
phia prima was Husserl’s expressed objective in coining 
transcendental phenomenology. On the contrary, Heideg-
gerian phenomenology has been lying at the very periphery 
of research interests (cf. Horrigan-Kelly et al. 2016), not in 
the least due to its considerable conceptual complexity that 
occasionally comes across as utter obscurantism to the non-
philosophically inclined.
Nevertheless, Heideggerian phenomenology as concep-
tual edifice and methodological toolbox for analyzing the 
ramifications of fundamental ontology is tailored to the 
exigency for overcoming the time-hallowed subject/object 
binarism that largely informs marketing research (Thompson 
et al. 1994). This binarism inheres in the broader market-
ing ontological terrain. As noted by Grassl (1999, p. 3), 
“idealists about brands see perceptual or cognitive acts of 
consumers grouped under the heading ‘brand awareness’ 
or ‘brand image’ as constitutive for the existence of brands 
[…] Realists, on the other hand, reject the view of brands 
as mere marks or names and inter-pret them as emergent 
products with properties that afford branding.” Overcom-
ing the binarism is attainable by adopting a praxiological 
(Schatzki 2000), rather than an epistemological approach, 
in line with the existential analytic that deploys in Being & 
Time (Heidegger 2001).
The existential analytic aims at “bringing to light the 
basic structures of Dasein” (Heidegger 1988, p. 227), pri-
oritizes meaning over epistemological criteria (and its cou-
pling, that is object ontology) and situates both subjects 
and objects in a vast nexus of cultural practices wherein 
they are inauthentically enmeshed. This does not imply that 
objects have the same ontological status as subjects, as the 
much popularized assemblage theory might contend. On the 
contrary, according to Heidegger’s explicit anthropocentric 
stance, humans are uniquely equipped both compared to 
other animals and objects for attending to the meaning of 
Being, mainly due to their being endowed with the gift of 
language. As shown earlier, the essence of Dasein’s exist-
ence is not exhausted in its relationship with ready-to-hand 
objects, but rests fundamentally in an horizon of possibilities 
which is transcendental with regard to their situated enmesh-
ment in ordinary affairs. The essence of Dasein stems from 
this web of meaning that is presided (so to speak) by Being. 
It is the totality of this meaningful whole that is impenetra-
ble to humans.
Experiential marketing converges with the praxiological 
orientation (Gahrn Andersen 2019) of Heidegger’s existen-
tial analytic insofar as it seeks to explain consumption by 
drawing not on epistemological categories and object ontol-
ogy as their correlate, but by coining wholly new catego-
ries that are sensitive to immersion (rather than distanced 
understanding). As noted by von Eckartsberg (1998a), in 
experiential marketing “the emphasis is on the study of 
lived experience, on how we read, enact, and understand 
our life-involvements.” The same orientation is shared by the 
application of phenomenological research tools in qualita-
tive inquiry (Cresswell and Poth 2018).
Most importantly, in experiential marketing “interpretive 
scholars have illuminated further the nature of extraordinary 
experiences (e.g., intense leisure activities)—referred to, as 
we saw, as “peak experiences” (Privette 1983), “epipha-
nies” (Denzin 1992), or transcendent customer experiences 
(Schouten, McAlexander and Koenig 2007). They found 
that extraordinary experiences are achieved through intense 
and focused activity, and absorption or immersion in those 
activities” (Schmitt and Zarantonello 2013, p. 45). Ec-stasis, 
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as noted earlier, is a fundamental trait of Dasein’s ontologi-
cal constituency. Dasein does not have to engage in a specific 
type of experiential activity to affirm its essence as always 
being outside of itself in a dialectical relationship with the 
disclosure of its thereness. This is a fundamental ontological 
condition as constant nearing and distantiation. In this sense, 
stressing that ‘transcendent customer experiences’ (TCE) 
constitute a specific type of consumption, “including feel-
ings such as self-transformation, separation from the ordi-
nary and mundane, and connectedness to larger phenomena 
outside one’s self” (Schouten et al. 2007, cited in Schmitt 
and Zarantonello 2013, p. 46) is ontologically superfluous.
The same holds for relational experiences, defined in an 
experiential marketing setting, albeit whose definitional 
contours are not phenomenologically informed, as “emerg-
ing from social contexts and relationships that occur during 
common consumption as part of a real or imagined commu-
nity or to affirm social identity” (Gentile et al. 2007, cited 
in Schmitt & Zarantonello 2013, p. 43). Dasein is ontologi-
cally relational by definition (de jure), and not contingently 
so (de facto).
On an even more concrete level, fundamental ontology 
meets experiential marketing, in a paradoxically divergent 
encounter, in the way near-death experiences are theorized 
by the latter. “Even death is seen as part of life. As one of 
the skydivers interviewed put it, ‘we do not have a death 
wish, we have a life wish!’” (Schmitt and Zarantonello 2013, 
p.46). In this instance, being-towards-death is employed as 
an experiential category by experiential marketing, albeit 
in an ontic, empirical manner, rather than as a fundamental 
ontological structure (as shown earlier).
Fundamental ontology, by dint of addressing each phe-
nomenon on both ontic and ontological levels is capable 
of accounting for the macro-cultural meaning of cultural 
practices such as social distancing, by making visible what 
may not be seen in plain view (e.g. what inheres in an empty 
space in-between subjects). In this manner, the distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity concerns how 
ontological structures may be unearthed through mundane 
experiences (what Adorno (1973) called- albeit critically- 
the fundamentum in re), and not a hierarchical stratifica-
tion from less to more authentic where inauthentic denotes 
“the sense of meaninglessness and superficiality in modern 
society” (Firat and Venkatesh, 1995, cited in Schmitt and 
Zarantonello 2013, p. 33). This intuitive employment of 
inauthenticity obfuscates the principle that what is authen-
tic and what is not, lies in the eyes of the beholder, i.e. it is a 
contingent, radically empirical judgment, without any trace 
of necessity (even more so of ontological gravity).
What is noteworthy, though, is the privileging in expe-
riential marketing of categories that are capable of captur-
ing consumptive experiences as such, rather than reducing 
them to brand associations stemming from experiencing, 
thus propagating the distinction between res cogitans and 
res extensa (the territory of experiential benefits, according 
to Keller, and of experiential value, according to Schmitt and 
Zarantonello 2013). It is in this mindset that the lived experi-
ence of the in-between space in the enactment of social dis-
tancing will be encapsulated in five experiential interpretive 
categories in the following section.
Five theses on social distancing 
from a fundamental ontological point 
of view
The nearness paradox‑social distancing harbors 
an ontological paradox: what lies nearby Dasein ‘is’ 
at the farthest extremes of its possibilities
“The shortening of distance, nearness, and remoteness con-
dition our existential and thinking modalities” (Koupannou 
2018, p.105). Social distancing implies the prohibition of 
physical proximity between at least two Daseins in public 
space. However, this inauthentically mandated distancing, 
i.e. a distance that abides by a metric system whereby natural 
space may be measured, also implies the Daseins’ physical 
proximity to an empty space that lies in-between. This at 
once distancing and the removal of distance has been called 
by Heidegger de-severance (cf. Eiland 1984). De-severance 
opens up a mobile space that is construed in interaction and 
as Daseins move in space, and assumes meaning seemingly 
due to being meaningless. It is just a void that separates 
two Daseins or a piece of land that is ready-to-hand in light 
of the cultural practice of social distancing. As per the ini-
tial exposition of the distinction between ready-to-hand and 
present-at-hand, it is precisely the breakdown of the ordinary 
meaning of an object that allows it to be theorized authen-
tically, from a fundamental ontological point of view. For 
example, a spatial territory outside of a supermarket that 
surrounds the entrance, is customarily used as the pathway 
to the store. This pathway is now interrupted by multiple fis-
sures that have disrupted the customary signification of this 
pathway. This emptying is tantamount to what Heidegger 
called ‘clearing’, that is an abstract space that is central to 
the constitution of the social (Schatzki 2000). In this abstract 
space lies being-towards-death as potentially being lethally 
contaminated by the virus. Insofar as death is equivalent 
to Dasein’s Being (Adorno 1973, p. 139), maintaining 
intersubjective distance is tantamount to being near one’s 
thereness. “Disclosedness, and not the shortness of physi-
cally measurable distance, is the true meaning of nearness” 
(Chaudhary 2020, p. 10). This proximity propagates the 
relationship between Dasein and death, insofar as to actual-
ize one’s potential, the limits of the interim space must be 
crossed. Since such a crossing would be suicidal, what is 
 G. Rossolatos 
most proximate to Dasein must be kept at a distance, a para-
dox in the heart of social distancing.
The deadzone‑the interim mobile space 
is a deadzone that harbors death as Dasein’s 
ownmost potentiality‑for‑Being
Social distancing essentially boils down to a reification 
(i.e. realization of a theoretical construct) of the ontologi-
cal difference between Being and beings by demarcating 
a deadzone in social interaction as essential condition of 
being-with. This deadzone fleshes out simulacrally authen-
tic temporality in a mobile and omnipresent hic et nunc. 
Therefore, what presences itself in the interim space near 
which Daseins are proximally placed in public space is 
Being as no-go zone and taboo space. This omnipresent 
interim space condenses ecstatically past and future. It is a 
post-apocalyptic simulacrum that inscribes death in-between 
subjects in a new cultural order brought about by the time 
of Covid-19 that revolves around a fundamental thanatog-
raphy. The deadzone is an omnipresent place that moves 
alongside beings, in the same fashion that Being, according 
to Heidegger, appears alongside beings. This mobile space is 
construed in co-ordinated movement of at least two subjects 
in public space. This is not an ordinary sign-post (e.g. cau-
tion: wet floor), but the ultimate sign-post: this is the taboo 
space of death. The mobile spatialization of this taboo space 
is equivalent to the inscription of death in social space as 
fundamental condition for being-with ontologically. Moreo-
ver, the meaning of this place is not dependent on individual 
brand associations, as per the associationist perspective on 
brand equity in general and place branding in particular, 
but is univocally and universally associated with death as 
possibility. Therefore, it is a fundamental social ontological 
condition.
Being‑with nihilistically‑the interim mobile space 
is an existential copula that unites subjects in their 
distancing via a void that stands for nihili locus
For Heidegger, existence is essentially intersubjective, as 
being-with (McMullin 2012). It is through the we-relation 
that the intersubjectivity of the lifeworld is developed and 
confirmed (Schutz and Luckmann 1974). Social distanc-
ing as mutually presupposing distance from one’s Being 
as horizon of possibilities procurs a set of co-ordinates 
for being-with in public space. On an ontical level, this 
co-ordination concerns the pragmatic need for regulating 
intersubjective movement and is incumbent on maintain-
ing distances between each other as mutual proximity to an 
interim space. This in-between space marks ontologically, 
i.e. unconditionally with regard to ontic determinants (any 
space becomes retrajectorized according to the demands of 
the virus) being-with in proximity. The reciprocity of beings 
originates out of the between (Theunissen 1984). At the 
same time, this space harbors subjects’ potential annihila-
tion. Therefore, the in-between mobile space that spatializes 
the practice of social distancing and is spatialized because 
of it, as a “practice of relationality and connectivity” (Lury 
et al. 2012, p. 12), is premised on annihilation due to the 
omnipresence of the virus. Being–with as being distanced 
in social space amounts to being proximate to an interim 
space as nihili locus.
The spectral space‑the metaphysics of presence 
has been substituted by a metaphysics of absence 
in a ghost space
Being is sustained in its materiality in the interim space that 
spatializes social distancing as the virus that is as imper-
ceptible (in plain view and sensing) as Being (as intangible 
construct). Yet, it performs the same social function as the 
fissure in the social text that unites social actors precisely 
as impossibility of full presencing. In this manner, the 
interim space that conditions social distancing constitutes 
a metaphorical space, spatialized by an epidemiological 
trope (Mitchell 2017). This metaphorical space has been 
branded according to a rationale of spectral play (Vanolo 
2018). What is housed in this spectral space is not absently 
present, but presently absent, i.e. a nanoparticle that stands 
for death as the end of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being. The 
virus does not have to actually be in the deadzone to perform 
its thanatohraphic role. If it is actually there, it cannot be 
seen in plain view, and if it is not there as a natural entity, it 
is still there in virtual state by dint of the spatialization strat-
egy that shelters it. This is what Derrida called fantasmatic 
ontopology, as an ontological ground in topology (Phillips 
2013; Burdett 2015) that is not static, but whose form is 
constituted in movement (Lury et al. 2012). “It is useful not 
to conceive the visible and the invisible as two distinct and 
separate spheres. By mobilizing the idea of the ghost, it is 
possible to think of a further plain situated in an intermedi-
ate position between the visible and the invisible” (Vanolo 
2018, p. 56).
The subversion of being by technology‑the interim 
mobile space is a rhetorical space that harbors 
a crime scene: the death of Being as the casualty 
of a lethal nanoparticle
As may be gauged by recourse to Heidegger’s prophetic 
effacement of the notion of distance in Time & Being (1972) 
with the proliferation of modern technologies (online dis-
cussion and teleconferencing platforms being a remarkable 
case in hand), the future is already here. If technology per-
forms an integral role, for Heidegger, in projecting Dasein’s 
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possibilities to the farthest corners of its horizon, and if this 
projection is an indispensable part of Dasein’s existence, 
then we have already stepped into a post-Being era where 
such infinite possibilities are, if not yet materialized, at least 
feasibly foreseeable. The central thesis that is propounded 
at this juncture is that Covid-19 constitutes the inauguration 
of this post-Being era, and that social distancing constitutes 
a mode-of-being in the world alongside others that is over-
determined by a moving interim space where this already 
appropriated post-Dasein future is engrafted.
The post-Dasein ascription pertains to the man-made 
(lab-made, more aptly) nature of the virus, yet an artifact that 
is not of the same order as ready-to-hand objects that abide 
by the instrumental rationality of equipment, as described by 
Heidegger (2001). It is an artifact that stands metonymically 
for Death, as the exhaustion of Dasein’s horizon of possibili-
ties or the end of the horizon. In the face of this artifact, the 
entire spectrum of Dasein’s ontic structures have been radi-
cally redefined which attests to the artifact’s equiprobable 
status as that of Being’s. At the same time, this artifact (as 
yet) is as inscrutable as Being.
To recapitulate, if technology, as envisaged by Heidegger, 
has the potential to radically redefine Dasein’s relationship 
to its horizon, thus taking the place of Being, then, at this 
juncture this replacement has already taken place. This is not 
an epochal replacement, as approximation and distancing of 
Dasein from its historical deployment in a uniform horizon 
that is delimited by Being, but a rupture with Being and the 
dawning of a new era where Being has been replaced by a 
technoscientific regime (Ihde 2009). In the same manner 
that being-towards-death is Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-
for-Being, being in proximity to Covid-19 as distance from 
another Dasein delimits an ontological territory where tech-
nology, in all its devastating potential, is inscribed as the 
new limit.
Conclusions
Arguably, social distancing constitutes a reification of Hei-
degger’s speculative rhetoric, a typical instance of fleshing 
out don quixotically a philosophical fabula. This may be 
shown most eminently by attending to how the ontological 
dimension becomes a necessary ground for ontic existence, 
that is through the tropicalization of the process of Being’s 
presencing. This process is grammatically construed with 
the employment of the middle voice which suspends the 
ascription of agentic status behind this presencing either 
to beings, as inauthentically enmeshed social actors, or to 
Being, as potentially being conflated ontotheologically with 
a transcendental entity (in a religious sense). This rhetorical 
stratagem was employed in a terrain where language and 
verbal communication were preponderant over other modes. 
Therefore, the quest for primordial meanings behind inau-
thentic practices, including linguistic ones, was undertaken 
by Heidegger by tracing genealogically and reviving archaic 
ways of lexical use, re-purposed in the context of the system 
of fundamental ontology. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s constant 
preoccupation with hyphenation in an attempt to capture 
the ‘world’s worlding’ in flux is indubitably exemplary and 
conducive to the furtherance of neologistic plasticity, for 
example by coining the term being-telepresent-at-hand.
In a technoscientific regime, situated in a post-ideological 
milieu where other modes, such as proxemics and kinetics, 
have also taken over the linguistic, the necessity of the onto-
logical emerges in the context of a relational, mobile spa-
tialization that leverages humans as participants in a ubiqui-
tous micronarrative of life and death. What is presenced in 
the interim space that conditions the performance of social 
distancing, is the ghostly apparition of man’s ends, divested 
of any instrumental teleology, as pure absence (i.e. death). It 
is in proximity to the space in-between that social distancing 
is performed. By dint of prioritizing the proxemic mode over 
the linguistic one, the meaning of this univocally branded 
interim space as branded place may not be captured by either 
subjectivist or objectivist accounts, but through experiential 
marketing categories. that seek to encapsulate immersive 
experiences that pass under the radar of the res cogitans.
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author 
states that there is no conflict of interest.
References
Adorno, Theodore. 1973. The jargon of authenticity. Evanston: 
Northwestern.
Ashworth, Gregory J., Mihalis Kavaratzis, and Gary Warnaby. 2015. 
The need to rethink place branding. In Rethinking place brand-
ing: Comprehensive brand development for cities and regions, 
ed. Mihalis Kavaratzis, Gary Warnaby, and Gregory J. Ashworth, 
1–13. New York: Springer.
Becker, Larissa. 2018. Methodological proposals for the study of con-
sumer experience. Qualitative Market Research: An International 
Journal 21 (4): 465–490.
Burdett, Michael S. 2015. Eschatology and the technological future. 
London: Routledge.
Chaudhary, Suraj. 2020. The ambiguity of nearness in Heidegger’s 
ort and Merleau-Ponty’s espace vécu. Journal of the Brit-
ish Society for Phenomenology. https ://doi.org/10.1080/00071 
773.2020.17439 54.
Chen, Xiangming, Anthony M. Orum, and Krista E. Paulsen. 2013. 
Introduction to cities: How place and space shape human experi-
ence. Sussex: Wiley.
Cresswell, John W., and Cheryl N. Poth. 2018. Qualitative inquiry & 
research design: Choosing among five approaches. London: Sage.
Desilet, Gregory. 1991. Heidegger and Derrida: The conflict between 
hermeneutics and deconstruction in the context of rhetorical 
 G. Rossolatos 
and communication theory. Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (2): 
152–175.
Eiland, Howard. 1984. The way to nearness: Heidegger’s interpretation 
of presence. Philosophy and Literature 8 (1): 43–54.
Elliott, Richard. 1997. Existential consumption and irrational desire. 
European Journal of Marketing 31 (3/4): 285–296.
Florek, Magdalena, and Mihalis Kavaratzis. 2014. From brand equity 
to place brand equity and from there to the place brand. Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy 10: 103–107.
Gahrn Andersen, Rasmus. 2019. Heideggerian phenomenology, prac-
tical ontologies and the link between experience and practices. 
Human Studies. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1074 6-019-09493 -8.
Govers, R., and F. Go. 2009. Place branding: Glocal, virtual and physi-
cal identities, constructed, imagined and experienced. London: 
Palgrave.
Grassl, Wolfgang. 1999. The reality of brands: Toward an ontology of 
marketing. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58: 
313–360.
Gross, Daniel M. 2005. Introduction: Being-moved: The pathos of 
Heidegger’s rhetorical ontology. In Heidegger and rhetoric, ed. 
Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann, 1–46. New York: SUNY.
Hackley, Christopher, and Rungpaka Tiwsakul. 2006. Entertainment 
marketing and experiential consumption. Journal of Marketing 
Communications 12 (1): 63–75.
Hanna, Sonya, and Jennifer Rowley. 2008. An analysis of terminology 
use in place branding. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4 
(1): 61–75.
Heidegger, Martin. 1972. On time and being. New York: Harper & 
Row.
Heidegger, Martin. 1988. The basic problems of phenomenology. Indi-
anapolis: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 2001. Being & time. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hess-Luttich, E.W.B. 2016. Urban discourse—city space, city lan-
guage, city planning: Eco-semiotic approaches to the discourse 
analysis of urban renewal. Sign Systems Studies 44 (1/2): 12–33.
Hirschman, E. 1986. Humanistic inquiry in marketing research, phi-
losophy, method and criteria. Journal of Marketing Research 23: 
237–249.
Hjortegaard Hansen, Rebecca. 2010. The narrative nature of place 
branding. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 6 (4): 268–279.
Holbrook, Morris B. 2018. Essay on the origins, development, and 
future of the consumption experience as a concept in marketing 
and consumer research. Qualitative Market Research: An Inter-
national Journal. https ://doi.org/10.1108/QMR-04-2018-0041.
Holbrook, M.B., and E.C. Hirschman. 1982. The experiential aspects 
of consumption: Consumer fantasies, feelings and fun. Journal of 
Consumer Research 9: 132–140.
Horrigan-Kelly, Marcella, Michelle Millar, and Maura Dowling. 
2016. Understanding the key tenets of Heidegger’s philosophy 
for interpretive phenomenological research. International Journal 
of Qualitative Methods 15 (1): 1–8.
Ihde, Don. 2009. Postphenomenology and technoscience. New York: 
SUNY.
Inwood, Michael. 1999. A Heidegger dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kalandides, A. 2011. The problem with spatial identity: Revisiting the 
sense of place. Journal of Place Management and Development 
4 (1): 28–39.
Karrer, Wolfgang. 2006. Limit thinking and boundary rhetoric—aA 
genealogy of borders. https ://www.resea rchga te.net/publi catio 
n/27279 5915
Kavaratzis, M.Giovanardi, and M. Lichrou (eds.). 2017. Inclusive place 
branding: Critical perspectives on theory and practice. London: 
Routledge.
Kavaratzis, Mihalis, and Greg Ashworth. 2015. Hijacking culture: The 
disconnection between place culture and place brands. Town Plan-
ning Review 86: 155–176.
Kavaratzis, M., and A. Kalandides. 2015. Rethinking the place 
brand: The interactional formation of place brands and the role 
of participatory place branding. Environment and Planning 47 
(6): 1368–1382.
Kouppanou, Anna. 2018. Technologies of being in Martin Hei-
degger: Nearness, metaphor and the question of education in 
digital times. London: Routledge.
Krell, David F. 1986. Intimations of mortality: Time, truth and fini-
tude in Heidegger’s Being & Time. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 
State University Press.
Krell, David F. 2015. Ecstasy, catastrophe: Heidegger from being 
and time to the black notebooks. New York: SUNY.
Lewin, David. 2012. The middle voice in Eckhart and modern con-
tinental philosophy. https ://www.resea rchga te.net/publi catio 
n/26874 1212.
Lucarelli, Andrea, and Sara Borbstrom. 2013. Problematizing place 
branding research: A metatheoretical analysis of the literature. 
The Marketing Review 13 (1): 65–81.
Lucarelli, Andrea, and Massimo Giovanardi. 2016. From “moving 
consumption” to “spacing consumption:” in search of consump-
tion geographies. Advances in Consumer Research 44: 324–328.
Lury, Celia, Luciana Parisi, and Tiziana Terranova. 2012. Introduc-
tion: The becoming topological of culture. Theory, Culture & 
Society 29 (4/5): 3–35.
Malpas, Jeff. 2012. Heidegger and the thinking of place: Explora-
tions in the topology of being. London: MIT Press.
Malpas, Jeff. 2018. Place and experience: A philosophical topogra-
phy. New: Routledge.
McMullin, Irene. 2012. Time and the shared world: Heidegger on 
social relations. Northwestern: Northwestern University Press.
Rae, Gavin. 2010. Re-thinking the human: Heidegger, fundamental 
ontology, and humanism. Human Studies 33: 23–39.
Rossolatos, George. 2018a. Impossibly good looks: A pragma-onto-
logical approach to unearthing the latent rhetorical structure 
of anti-aging advertising discourse. Sign Systems Studies 46 
(2/3): 216–254.
Rossolatos, George. 2018b. Interdiscursive readings in cultural 
consumer research. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Schol-
ars Publishing.
Rossolatos, George. 2020a. A brand storytelling approach to Cov-
id-19’s terrorealization: Cartographing the narrative space of a 
global pandemic. Journal of Destination Marketing & Manage-
ment 18 (Dec): 1–10.
Rossolatos, George. 2020b. The supplement at the… sau(r)ce: On 
Jamie Oliver’s global brand identity. Journal of Place Branding 
& Public Diplomacy 16: 109–120.
Schatzki, Theodore R. 2000. A new societist social ontology. Phi-
losophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2): 174–202.
Schmitt, Bernd, and Lia Zarantonello. 2013. Consumer experience 
and experiential marketing: A critical review. Review of Market-
ing Research 10: 25–61.
Schutz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. 1974. The structures of the 
life-world, vol. I. London: Heinemann.
Sloterdijk, Peter. 2012. Nearness and Da-sein: The spatiality of 
Being and Time. Theory, Culture & Society 29 (4/5): 36–42.
Theunissen, M. 1984. The other: Studies in the social ontology of 
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber. Massachusetts: MIT 
Press.
Thompson, C., W. Locander, and H. Pollio. 1989. Putting consumer 
experience back into consumer research: The philosophy and 
method of existential phenomenology. Journal of Consumer 
Research 17: 133–147.
Thompson, C.J., R.P. Howard, and B.L. William. 1994. The spoken 
and the unspoken: A hermeneutic approach to understanding the 
cultural viewpoints that underlie consumers’ expressed meanings. 
Journal of Consumer Research 21: 432–452.
So near, so far, so what is social distancing? A fundamental ontological account of a mobile place…
Tuan, Yi-Fu. 2001. Space and place: The perspective of experience. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
von Eckartsberg, Rolf. 1998a. Introducing existential-phenomenolog-
ical psychology. In Phenomenological inquiry in psychology: 
Existential and transpersonal dimensions, ed. Ron Valle, 3–20. 
California: Springer.
von Eckartsberg, Rolf. 1998. Existential-phenomenological research. 
In Phenomenological inquiry in psychology: Existential and 
transpersonal dimensions, ed. Ron Valle, 21–62. California: 
Springer.
Warnaby, Gary, and Dominic Medway. 2013. What about the ‘place’ in 
place marketing? Marketing Theory 13 (3): 345–363.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
